Vol. 19: Don't Push Your Friends to the Other Side: Why Closed-Door Sectarianism Fails, from "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism"
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Closed-door sectarianism just "drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets," and it will drive the "millions and millions" of the masses, this "mighty army," over to the enemy's side, thus winning only the plaudits of the enemy.
—Mao Zedong, "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism"
"On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism" is a long report Mao gave after the Wayaobu Conference in December 1935.1
When I first started reading the Selected Works at seventeen, I actually skipped through this essay.
Back then, what interested me most was the theory of knowledge in "On Contradiction." The question I wanted to figure out was how a person should understand the world and get along with it. So I read this essay very roughly, and in my later rereadings I didn't pay it much attention either.
Only after I really went out into the world and stepped in plenty of holes and took a few hits at work and in getting things done did it slowly dawn on me: what this essay talks about is actually very practical, especially as a method of work. It tries to teach us how to cooperate with an imperfect world.
What it tackles is something we don't often talk about, but that makes people shake their heads the moment it comes up: closed-door sectarianism.
Closed-Door Sectarianism: An Arrogant Trap of Isolation
To read this essay, you first need to look at the situation Mao faced at the end of 1935.
The Central Red Army had just reached northern Shaanxi at the end of the Long March. It had lost huge numbers of men along the way, the northern Shaanxi base area was thin, and outside, Chiang Kai-shek's hundreds of thousands of troops still had it surrounded layer upon layer.
At the same time, the external environment had changed fundamentally: Japan was stepping up its invasion of North China, and the whole nation faced a crisis of survival. Where the principal contradiction had been the fight between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the biggest contradiction had now become the national contradiction between China and Japan.2
As the principal contradiction shifted, a very stubborn voice emerged in the Party.
That voice was called "closed-door sectarianism."
People who held the closed-door view believed their stand was the firmest and their revolution the purest. In their eyes, things were black and white: since we represent the workers and peasants, the national bourgeoisie is weak and wavering, the regional warlords (Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, Cai Tingkai, and others) are all reactionaries, and the rich peasants and intellectuals can't be relied on either.3
Their logic was rigid:
"The revolution can only rely on our own pure ranks. Working with others is compromise. Anyone who argues for uniting with others is wavering."
At the Wayaobu Conference, Mao criticized this closed-door sectarianism thoroughly.
He used an old saying, "drive the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets,"4 meaning you want to catch fish but chase them all into the deep pool, you want to catch birds but scare them all into the woods.
The closed-door sectarians thought shutting the door meant holding on to purity. But in actually getting things done, what this amounts to is shutting the door to crown yourself king, and isolating yourself.
| Strategy | Core mindset | Attitude toward middle forces | What it actually brings |
|---|---|---|---|
| Closed-door sectarianism | Black and white; chase absolute purity | Reject them completely; push them to the other side | Isolation, dwindling strength, a road that keeps narrowing |
| United front | One divides into two; look at the principal contradiction | Draw on each one's strengths; seek common ground while setting aside differences | Unite the majority, reduce resistance, make as many friends as possible |
Mao puts it very bluntly in the essay:
The tactics of closed-door sectarianism are the tactics of the regal isolationist. Closed-door sectarianism just "drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets," and it will drive the "millions and millions" of the masses, this "mighty army," over to the enemy's side, thus winning only the plaudits of the enemy. In practice, closed-door sectarianism is the faithful servant of the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. The "purity" and "straightness" of the closed-door sectarians are nothing but high-sounding empty talk, and only fools would believe in them.5
Think about it. With a great enemy at the gates, closed-door sectarianism forcibly pushed all the forces that could have been won over onto the opponent's side, leaving itself to fight alone.
The principle behind it is very practical: in a complicated reality, "we're the purest" gets nothing done. Lofty self-regard cut off from the real balance of forces is, at bottom, idealism covering up incompetence.
Breaking the Illusion of Purity: The Logic of Drawing on Each One's Strengths
Unlike the closed-door sectarians, Mao's answer to the contradiction was what we often hear called the "united front."
Many people take the united front as a temporary compromise or a way of pulling strings. But seen dialectically, it's really a way of thinking about how to borrow strength in the real world, and how to turn resistance into help.
It asks us, when we look at people, things, and decisions, to first set aside two unrealistic ideas:
First, drop the binary friend-or-enemy thinking. People aren't black or white. Everyone has different sides. The national bourgeoisie had a wavering side, but also a side that resisted invasion. The regional power holders had their own little calculations, but also real interests in not becoming traitors and not being swallowed up by Chiang Kai-shek. Judge people in their specific circumstances. Don't write someone off entirely because they have flaws.
Second, drop the fantasy of the perfect partner. Getting things done isn't looking for a soulmate. You don't need others to match you completely in ideas, personality, and habits. As long as you share common interests in the one core thing in front of you, you can work together.
Put this principle in the simplest words, and it's this:
Getting something done can't rest on lofty purity. Accepting other people's limits and drawing on each one's strengths is the key to solving problems.
One person's strength is limited, but collective strength is unlimited. Closed-door sectarianism looks resolute, but at bottom it uses going it alone to avoid real cooperation.
Getting things done isn't finding a flawless perfect partner. It's finding points of support who share your aims on a specific goal.
As long as there are common interests, there's a chance to borrow strength. Don't completely deny someone's value in a particular part of the work because of their limits.
From Closing the Country to the Self-Strengthening Movement: Shutting Doors and Borrowing Strength in History
Look at this closed-door flaw in history and it's very clear.
The early Qing dynasty's policy of closing the country was, at bottom, closed-door sectarianism at the level of a state.
The court back then thought of itself as the Celestial Empire and everything outside as barbarians. It shut the door tight and rejected everything foreign.
By the late Qing, after taking a beating, some people began to rethink this shut-door self-defense.
Wei Yuan proposed "learn the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control the barbarians,"6 and later Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and others launched the Self-Strengthening Movement.
The foreigners were still invaders, and China and the West had huge contradictions in institutions, culture, and interests.
By pure closed-door logic, since the other side were invaders and their institutions were completely different from ours, we should firmly reject everything of theirs and have nothing to do with it.
But the Self-Strengtheners saw one thing clearly: faced with the biggest question of all, survival, you can't deny the usefulness of the other side's advanced technology just because they're your opponent or deeply at odds with you.
So, braving the attacks of conservatives at court, they began building arsenals, making steamships, setting up telegraphs, and sending students abroad.7 Even though each side was on guard against the other and their ideas were completely different, when it came to very concrete industrial technologies like guns, machines, and shipbuilding, they put their emotional squeamishness aside and honestly borrowed the other side's strengths to make up for their own weaknesses.
That's breaking with closed-door sectarianism: drop the emotion of absolute rejection, and on the key questions, draw on each one's strengths and put them to your own use.
Two Lessons of My Own About Closed-Door Sectarianism
Put this logic into everyday life and work, and you'll find that many people are practicing closed-door sectarianism without realizing it.
A lot of the time, the reason we feel so worn out and can't move things forward is the closed-door sectarianism in our own heads.
I took a long detour on this myself.
The First Time
In my first few years of work, I had a strong streak of perfectionism.
Back then I held many things to very high standards and always felt others weren't thorough enough or weren't thinking about things the right way. When I was pushing a project in a team, the moment I saw a collaborator fall a little short of what I expected, I'd feel very uncomfortable.
Eventually I even came to think: rather than spending time communicating with people, explaining things, and helping them fix their work, I might as well do it all myself.
At the time I thought that was taking responsibility and doing things well.
But I soon hit a wall.
As more and more landed on my plate and the pace got faster and faster, going it alone simply collapsed. Even working myself to exhaustion every day, there was only so much one person could do. In the end, not only did the overall progress slow down, but because I was running on empty, I made mistakes at key moments.
That lesson made me feel, for the first time, that one person's strength is limited, but collective strength is unlimited.
Facing a complex task, you can't have both the purity of total control and high efficiency and results.
A lot of the time, when we say "others can't be relied on, so I have to do it myself," on the surface it looks like perfectionism, but really it's a kind of closed-door sectarianism: we don't want to face the hassle and friction of working together, so we hide in our own little corner.
If you want to get things done, you have to let go of the obsession with going it alone and learn to accept imperfect cooperation.
The Second Time
I once had a manager.
For a long time, I actually had a pretty low opinion of him. I thought his way of handling daily issues and answering specific business questions was all over the place, jumping around a lot. A few times I brought him concrete problems with execution, and his answers were completely beside the point. They didn't solve anything.
After hitting a wall a few times, my closed-door sectarianism flared up again.
I decided in my head that he simply wasn't capable, and after that I never went to him with anything. I treated him as if he weren't there.
Later, I started watching how he answered other people's questions, and found that on certain kinds of questions his answers were really good. So whenever I ran into those kinds of problems, I'd go to him for advice, and every time I got real help.
Gradually I understood: I used to think he wasn't any good because I was measuring everyone with the same ruler. I always expected a manager to know every execution detail at the bottom level and also have superb coordination skills.
That in itself was an unrealistic kind of perfectionism.
Everyone has areas and directions they're good at and ones they're not, and I can't claim to have mastered every skill either. For years I've stressed that every craft has its specialists, and when you hit a difficulty, you should ask a professional in that area. The problem will be solved easily, and you'll grow too.
And even while pushing myself with this open-minded idea, I still fell into closed-door sectarianism. At bottom, that's the sin of arrogance.
After that, I changed how I worked with him.
I only asked him about the problems he was good at solving, and for everything else, I went to people who were good at those.
A person doesn't need to be good at everything to be a help to you.
From the angle of solving problems, we don't need the other person to be flawless. Figure out where their strengths and weaknesses are, then draw on each one's strengths, and things get done.
Closing
The worst thing in getting things done is being stuck in the closed-door sectarianism of moral squeamishness and perfectionism.
Shutting the door and doing it yourself saves trouble, because you don't have to compromise with anyone, deal with disagreements, or put up with other people's flaws.
But in the real world, almost nothing of weight can be done by one person alone.
**Don't let an obsession with purity push people who could have been your helpers into outsiders, or even opponents.
Learning to accept imperfection, and drawing on each one's strengths around the main goal, is the real beginning of maturity.
Footnotes
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From December 17 to 25, 1935, the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo at Wayaobu in northern Shaanxi, which set the policy of building an anti-Japanese national united front. On December 27, Mao gave this report, based on the spirit of the meeting, at a meeting of Party activists in Wayaobu. See: Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, ed., Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–1949), Vol. 1, Central Party Literature Press, 2013, pp. 494–497; Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, History of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 1 (1921–1949), CPC History Press, 2011, pp. 388–392. ↩
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In the second half of 1935, Japanese imperialism engineered the "North China Incident," and the national contradiction between China and Japan rose sharply to become the principal contradiction in Chinese society, bringing major shifts in domestic class relations. See: Jin Chongji, ed., Biography of Mao Zedong (1893–1949), Central Party Literature Press, 1996, pp. 359–364. ↩
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In 1933, Cai Tingkai and other generals of the Nineteenth Route Army launched the "Fujian Incident" to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. Under the influence of "Left" closed-door sectarianism, Bo Gu, Li De (Otto Braun), and others failed to build real cooperation with them. At the end of 1935, the CPC Central Committee learned from this and actively worked to win over Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army and Yang Hucheng's Northwestern Army, which eventually led to the anti-Japanese national united front. See: Jin Chongji, Outline History of Twentieth-Century China, Vol. 1, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009, pp. 312–316; Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. I, People's Publishing House, 1991, pp. 148–154. ↩
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"Drive the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets" comes from Mencius, Li Lou I: "So it is the otter that drives the fish into the deep, the hawk that drives the sparrows into the thicket, and Jie and Zhou who drove the people to Tang and Wu." (The text writes 爵 for 雀, "sparrow"; 鹯 is a hawk.) See: Yang Bojun, Mencius: Translation and Annotation, Zhonghua Book Company, 2008, p. 174. ↩
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From Mao Zedong, "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism," Part III, "Closed-Door Sectarianism." See: Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. I, People's Publishing House, 1991, pp. 157–158. ↩
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At Lin Zexu's request, Wei Yuan compiled the Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms after the Opium War. In the preface to the 1842 edition, he explicitly put forward "learn the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control the barbarians," urging China to learn advanced Western military and scientific technology to resist foreign aggression. See: Wei Yuan, Preface to the Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms, Zhonghua Book Company, 1998; Tsiang Tingfu, Modern Chinese History, Yuelu Press, 1987, pp. 32–36. ↩
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Starting in the 1860s, the Self-Strengtheners founded the Jiangnan Arsenal (1865), the Fuzhou Navy Yard (1866), the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company (1872), and the Tianjin Telegraph Administration (1880), and from 1872 sent young boys to study in the United States. See: John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2 (Chinese edition, China Social Sciences Press, 1985), pp. 178–215; Tsiang Tingfu, Modern Chinese History, Yuelu Press, 1987, pp. 45–56. ↩